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SURVEY: THE PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN
RELATIONS COMMISSION
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission has
greatly increased its efforts in investing and prosecuting unlaw-
ful discriminatory practices.' Created in 1955, the Commission
is given the power "to formulate policies to effectuate the pur-
pose ' 2 of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act' and to "ini-
tiate, receive, investigate and pass upon complaints charging un-
lawful discriminatory practices."
4
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the parties subject
to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the recent interpreta-
tions of the amendments expanding the prohibitions outlined in
the Act, the practical effects of the Commission's procedural rules,
the remedies available to it in dealing with offenders, and a brief
analysis of the Commission's use of its administrative powers. Spe-
cial attention will be focused on the Commission's dealings in the
areas of sex discrimination and school desegregation; federal in-
volvement 5 in these areas will be excluded.
There are three general classes of persons over whom the Hu-
man Relations Act has jurisdiction: (1) Employers, employment
agencies and labor organizations, (2) places of public accommoda-
tions, resort or amusement, and (3) owners, real estate agents,
1. In fiscal year 1972 the Commission received 982 cases, 82.5%
more than its average annual caseload during the 1962-69 period. 1972
PA. HumAN RELATIONS COMM'N ANN. REP. 29.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 957 (e) (1964).
3. Id. § 951 et seq.
4. Id. § 957 (f). The Commission also has the power, inter alia:
(f.1) To investigate where no complaint has been filed but
with the consent of at least eight of the members of the Commis-
sion any problem of racial discrimination with the intent of avoid-
ing and preventing the development of racial tension.
(f.2) On request of the Governor, to investigate claims of ex-
cessive use of force by police in civil rights protest activities.
(g) To hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, compel their at-
tendance, administer oaths, take testimony of any person under
oath or affirmation, and in connection therewith, to require the
production for examination of any books and papers relating to
any matter under investigation where a complaint has been prop-
erly filed before the Commission. ...
See generally PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 957 (Supp. 1972), for an enumeration
of the Commission's powers and duties.
5. For discussion of this area see, e.g., 1968 DuxE L.J. 671, and 31
U. Pnr. L.J. 671 (1970).
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builders and mortgage lenders in the selling, leasing or financing
of commercial housing.6
II. EMPLOYERS
A. Employers' Discrimination with Respect to Pay,
Hiring, Promotion, and Leaves
The Human Relations Act has made it an unlawful discrimi-
natory practice for an employer 7 "to refuse to hire or employ, or
to bar or discharge from employment [an] individual or to other-
wise discriminate against such individual with respect to compen-
sation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment" because of the individual's race, color, religious creed, an-
cestry, age, sex, or national origin." The Commission has recently
interpreted this subsection to include an employer's requirement
for mandatory leaves in the case of pregnant employees as an un-
lawful discriminatory practice. In Ricco v. Atalski,9 the com-
plainant was employed by the Carmichaels Area School District.
She became pregnant and requested the district for a leave of
absence for the months of September and October, 1971. The school
board maintained a policy which required that "no more than two
maternity leaves will be granted to a teacher in the school system
during her teaching career and ... once a teacher has been granted
a maternity leave, she had to be absent from teaching for a period
of one year from the date such leave was granted."'10 Hence,
the board refused to grant the complainant's request for reinstate-
ment until the required one year period had elapsed. The Com-
mission concluded that the one year dismissal of complainant Ricco
solely because of her pregnancy was based on the school board's
general assumptions attributed to a given sex, and no considera-
tion was given to her individual ability to perform the functions
and duties of her employment." Thus, the Commission found the
school board in violation of Section 5(a) of the Human Relations
6. 16 PA. CODE § 41.1(a) (1972).
7. The Act defines an employer as including "the Commonwealth
or any political subdivision ... thereof and any person employing four or
more persons within the Commonwealth." The term includes religious,
fraternal, charitable or sectarian groups, not supported by the government
only to the extent that their discriminatory practices relating to race,
color, age, or national origin are regulated. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954
(b) (Supp. 1972).
8. Id. § 955(a).
9. No. E-4465 (Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, Dec. 20,
1972).
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 3.
Act,12 and ordered the school board to pay Ricco back wages for
the period from December 1, 1971, the time at which she was ready,
able, and available for work, through August 31, 1972, the termina-
tion date of that school year. The respondent school board
was also ordered to change its policy on maternity leaves to com-
ply with the Commission's regulations.
The Commission relied on its policy statement, Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex,13 as authority for its holding in
Ricco. The Commission's policy regarding childbirth leave treats
any penalty in the terms or conditions of employment resulting
from a woman employee's absence from work "on account of child-
bearing" as an unlawful discriminatory practice. Childbearing
is to be treated by all employers covered by the Human Relations
Act as a valid justification for a leave of absence for a reasonable
time period.
14
This policy was recently cited with approval by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in Cerra v. East Stroudsberg Area School
District.15 In Cerra, a pregnant teacher was dismissed by the School
Board on two grounds. First, Mrs. Cerra's failure to resign at the
end of her fifth month of pregnancy constituted a willful dis-
obedience of the Board regulation. Second, the Board found her
physically unable to perform her teaching duties because of her
pregnancy. 16 The court, in reversing the Board's decision,1 7 dis-
missed the incompetency charge holding that a physical disability
resulting in a temporary absence is not within the meaning of in-
competency as intended by the Public School Code"' as a valid rea-
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a) (Supp. 1972).
13. 1 PA. BULL. 707 (Dec. 19, 1970), as amended 1 PA. BULL. 2359
(Dec. 25, 1971).
14. Id. at 2359.
The conditions applicable to childbirth leave and to return to
employment may be in accordance with the employer's regular
leave policy, provided that the female employe shall be entitled to
receive any accumulated sick, disability, and vacation benefits
accrued by her at the time of the leave. She shall not be required
to leave at the expiration of any arbitrary time period during
pregnancy and may continue to work as long as she is capable of
performing the duties of her job.
A female employe shall be entitled to take a leave of absence
for childbirth for a reasonable length of time indicated by her
at the time the leave begins. Following childbirth, and upon
signifying her intent to return, such female employee shall be
reinstated to her original job or to a position of like status and
pay, without loss of previously earned seniority and pension rights
on other service credits and benefits.
15. 450 Pa. 207, 299 A.2d 277 (1973).
16. Id. at 209, 299 A.2d at 278. Mrs. Cerra was dismissed on May 22,
1970, twelve days before the end of the school term because she was more
than five months pregnant. She gave birth on July 27, 1970, and offered
to return to her position with the District in September, 1970, but was re-
fused.
17. The Board's decision was affirmed by both the Common Pleas
Court of Monroe County and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. 3
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 665, 285 A.2d 206 (1972).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 11-1122 (1962).
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son for termination of the employment contract.'9 The court also
found that the Board's regulation requiring resignation after five
months of pregnancy violated the Human Relations Act. It refused
to hear the argument that the regulation insures "continuity in
classroom instruction and alleviates burdensome administrative
problems" noting that any other temporary disability, even the
common cold, caused these problems and that efficiency should
not be the sole consideration. 20 In deciding that regulations such
as the one promulgated by the East Stroudsburg Area School Board
are discriminatory, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has put its
authority behind the Commission's interpretation of Section 5(a)
to include termination-because-of-pregnancy regulations as un-
lawful discriminatory practices.
There are three recent cases which have helped to define the
facts which must be present before the Commission can apply Sec-
tion 5(a) of the Act. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court 21
reversed the Commission in Wilkinsburg School District v. Human
Relations Commission,22 where it found that the Commission's find-
ings of elements of racial discrimination were not supported by the
record. The complainant was a black teacher employed by the
district to teach in a school with predominantly black population.
The incident involved a white teacher's destruction of "Black His-
tory" pamphlets which some students brought into her classroom
and had been prepared by the black teacher for use in her own
class.23 This incident and the apparent hostility between the two
teachers caused the school district to reassign both of them to dif-
ferent schools. Subsequently, the complainant received a poor
performance rating in her new position, which resulted in her
dismissal, and commenced this action. The Commission found that
the district discriminated against her by putting her in a posi-
tion for which she was not certified or experienced to hold and
that that action started the chain of events which resulted in her
dismissal. The district's racial bias was supported by the finding
that its officials were "unaware of or unconcerned with Black His-
tory Week" in a largely black high school. 24 There are three im-
portant points that arise by implication from the Wilkinsburg de-
19. 450 Pa. at 211, 299 A.2d at 279.
20. rd. at 214, 299 A.2d at 280.
21. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has appellate jurisdiction
over the Human Relations Commission pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§§ 211.101-211.510 (Supp. 1972) (Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970),
and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 960 (Supp. 1972).
22. 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 378 (1972).
23. Id. at 381.
24. Id. at 382.
cision. First, the court found that the school officials' unaware-
ness of Black History Week could not even support an inference
of the existence of a racially biased state of mind.25 This statement
implies that in the absence of additional evidence in the record,
facts giving rise to a mere inference of a racially biased state of
mind are barely sufficient to support a finding of discrimina-
tion. Second, inexcusable acts and attitudes of a fellow employee,
such as the destruction of the complainant's booklets here, are
neither sufficient to support nor relevant to a conclusion that the
employer is guilty of an unlawful discriminatory act.2 6 The rec-
ord must support an additional finding that the employer is vicar-
iously responsible for both the attitude and conduct of its em-
ployee.2 7 Third, findings of discriminatory treatment cannot be
supported without "evidence that other teachers in their reassign-
ment or in the performance of their assignments were accorded
different treatment. '2 In order to support a finding of different
treatment2 9 one would not only have to have facts in the record
showing the treatment received by the complainant, but also facts
showing the treatment given to the other employees to make the
comparison between the two and support the finding that there
is indeed discrimination.
Facts supporting a finding of different treatment were pres-
ent in Harris v. Pennsylvania Department of Insurance,8 ° however,
there was no evidence to support a finding that this different
treatment was based on the complainant's sex as was alleged.
Over a thirteen month period four men were prompted into posi-
tions for which the female complainant was also eligible. The
findings that all those promoted from the complainant's position
to a higher position held equal or superior qualifications to those
possessed by the complainant were not sufficient to support a
conclusion that the promotions were motivated by considerations




27. Id. This obvious connection could probably be easily made by a
showing of actual or implied authority for the employee to perform the
act in the name of the employer. Here, the court apparently felt that this
authority was absent, hence no responsibility for the act could accrue to
the school district.
28. Id. at 383.
29. "Discrimination-Any difference in treatment based on race, color,
religious creed, ancestry, sex, age or national origin whether or not in-
tentional." 16 PA. CODE § 41.1 (a) (1972).
30. No. E-4260 Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, Oct. 24,
1972).
31. Id. In dicta, the Commission noted that the Department of Insur-
ance employed 49 Insurance Examiners of which only five were women all
of whom held the lowest position of Insurance Examiner I. More than
half of the 44 males held higher level positions of Insurance Examiner
II through IV. The Commission urged the Department to give "highest
priority" to recruiting women for these positions and to "increase their
advancement within the department as rapidly as possible." Id. at 4.
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Although these two cases demonstrate the necessity for evi-
dence of different treatment based on race, sex, or the other cate-
gories enumerated in the Act, the different treatment need not
occur during the same period of time as long as there appears to
be a common relationship between the party discriminated against
and the party given preferential treatment. The Commission
awarded $780 in back pay and $780 in compensation for "mental
suffering, anguish, and humiliation" in Hopkins v. Montour Mo-
tor Inn.3 2 After working for the respondent for a year, the com-
plainant, a female, was put on a $90 weekly salary in January,
1970, and continued to receive that amount until she was "released"
from her employment at the end of September, 1970. 33 The com-
plainant's replacement, a male, was hired at a salary of $110 a
week and his duties and responsibilities were less extensive than
those of the complainant.8 4 The lack of evidence that the com-
plainant was offered the raise before she was released from her
employment, and the finding that her replacement assumed less re-
sponsbility for more pay were two crucial factors justifying the
Commission's conclusion that the complainant did not receive the
$110 salary because of her sex.
A synthesis of these three recent cases will reveal some cru-
cial facts which the complainant must enter into the record before
maintaining a successful action before the Commission. First,
evidence of the treatment afforded to the complainant and the
treatment afforded to others similarly situated must be shown,
obviously emphasizing the difference between the two. Second, the
complainant must give evidence to support a finding that the dif-
ferent treatment was based on race, color, sex, etc. This is done
by showing that the position, and the duties and responsibilities
were substantially similar, so the employer would have no valid
reason for making the distinction. Third, there is the obvious, but
necessary, requirement that the respondent employer must be the
one responsible for the discriminatory practice. The complain-
ant can easily prove this by simply showing that the employer
committed the discriminatory act himself or that he is vicariously
responsible for the acts of the complainant's co-employees. Fi-
32. No. E-3920 (Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, Dec. 20,
1972).
33. Id. at 1. The findings are not clear as to whether the complainant
was fired or quit voluntarily. There was, however, a finding that her
performance of her assigned duties was done in a satisfactory manner.
34. Id. at 2. The $780 award was arrived at by noting the difference
in salaries ($20) and multiplying that by the number of weeks (39) during
which the complainant was employed at the inferior salary.
nally, the complainant must make sure he does not fall into the two
exceptions to Section 5 of the Act.
The first exception concerns only retirement, pension or group
insurance plans. 83 It is not an unlawful discriminatory practice
to set a mandatory retirement age and to terminate one's employ-
ment when he reaches that age. The compulsory resignation-at-
age sixty provision 6 of the Pennsylvania State Police was recently
upheld by the commonwealth court in McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania
State Police 7 President Judge Bowman, writing for the majority
stated:
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act does not abso-
lutely protect one against discharge from employment by
reason of age; it does not guarantee retention of employ-
ment until death or proof of the employee's inability to
perform. Rather it is designed to protect against discrimi-
nation in discharge from employment by reason of age
and in doing so recognizes a "bona fide occupational quali-
fication" as nondiscriminatory, as are terminations of em-
ployment by reason of retirement and pension plans and
other like programs.3
8
The physical fitness and ability of a particular officer to perform
his job and the Legislature's use of its discretion in selecting a
particular mandatory retirement age over other ages are not rele-
vant in proving a lack of good faith as to an occupational quali-
fication which is otherwise uniformly and nondiscriminatorily
applied to the employees as a class.3 9
This bona fide occupational qualification mentioned by the
McIlvaine court is the second exception to the application of Sec-
tion 5. An employer must file a request for a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification exemption with the Commission in order to
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (a) (Supp. 1972):
The provision of this paragraph shall not apply, to (1) termination
of employment because of the terms or conditions of any bona
fide retirement or pension plan, (2) operation of terms or conditions
of any bona fide retirement or pension plan which have the effect
of a minimum service requirement, (3) operation of the terms or
conditions of any bona fide group or employee insurance plan.
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 65(d) (Supp. 1972):
(d) Any member of the Pennsylvania State Police, except the
Commissioner, and Deputy Commissioner, regardless of rank,
who has attained or who shall attain the age of sixty years, shall
resign from membership in the state police force....
37. 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 505, 296 A.2d 630 (1972). Plaintiff McI1-
vaine attained age sixty on July 7, 1970. He was a captain, in good physi-
cal condition and the commanding officer of a troop. He was dropped
from the rolls of the State Police solely because of the mandatory re-
tirement provisions of the Administrative Code of 1929. See note 37
supra. McIlvaine attacked this statute as being violative of his civil
rights as protected by the Human Relations Act.
38. 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 511, 296 A.2d at 633.
39. Id. at 512, 296 A.2d at 633. The court cites Boyle v. Philadelphia,
338 Pa. 129, 12 A.2d 43 (1940), as authority supporting its holding that a




avoid the application of the act.40 It is the policy of the Com-
mission to grant sex exemptions only when the employer can dem-
onstrate an overriding need for such exemption.4 1 "[G]eneral as-
sumptions on the aptitude or ability of persons of one sex not dem-
onstrated in fact" are not an acceptable demonstration of need for
the exemption.
42
One novel argument advanced by the defendant in Kober v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.43 was that the Pennsylvania Women's
Labor Law,44 which limited the hours women could work, cre-
ated a bona fide occupational qualification exemption for all jobs
which required a workday of greater than eight hours. The Ko-
ber court found that, although the federal act under which the suit
was brought contained a savings provision 45 expressly declaring
that the act not exempt anyone from liability imposed by any
state laws, the Pennsylvania Women's Labor Law conflicted with
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that the federal law
prevailed under the supremacy clause.4 The Pennsylvania At-
torney General also issued an opinion 47 which noted the con-
flict between the Human Relations Act and the Women's Labor
Law and declared that the Women's Labor Law was impliedly
40. Id.
41. 1 PA. BULL. at 708 (Dec. 19, 1970).
42. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, (§ 1), 1 PA. BuLL.
at 707. Section 6 provides:
The procedure for securing such exemptions is to write to the
Commission requesting a bona fide occupational qualification ex-
emption and stating:
1. The jobs involved by title, number of positions, and du-
ties, demonstrating why all persons of one sex cannot perform
the functions of the job.
2. The reasons for requesting the exemption.
3. The length of time for which the exemption is desired.
4. The appropriate references to United States Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission guidelines, regulations or decisions.
• . . The fact that a bona fide occupational exemption is secured
after a complaint is filed will not affect the subject matter of the
complaint. In fact, the Commission's exemption, if granted, will
only be effective after the resolution of any complaints presently
pending against the requesting party.
In practice, the Commission gives out very few exemptions, limiting
them to obvious occupations such as wet nurse, male model, female
model, etc. Exemptions are considered on a case by case basis, there are
really no guidelines which can be generally applied. 16 PA. CODE § 41.71
(1972).
43. 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971). This suit was brought under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 103 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1970).
46. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
47. 1969 PA. OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATT'Y GEN., noted in Holland
v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 4 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 292 (1972).
repealed because the intent and language used in the later statute
disclosed an irreconcilable inconsistency between the two acts.
48
B. Sex Discrimination in Newspaper Classified Employment
Advertising
Section 5(b) (2) of the Act 49 makes an employer's or employ-
ment agency's publishing or causing to be published any advertise-
ment relating to employment which indicates a preference based
upon sex an unlawful discriminatory practice. Section 5 (e) de-
clares it an unlawful discriminatory practice:
[f] or any person . . . to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce
the doing of any act declared by this section to be an un-
lawful discriminatory practice, or to obstruct or prevent
any person from complying with the provisions of this
act . . . or to attempt, directly or indirectly, to commit
any act declared by this section to be an unlawful dis-
criminatory practice.50
The City of Pittsburgh created a Pittsburgh Commission on Hu-
man Relations5' and enacted a Human Relations Ordinance52 with
sections which are nearly identical to Sections 5(b) (2) and 5(e) of
the Human Relations Act. 53  The National Organization for
Women filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations charging the Pittsburgh Press Company with vio-
lations of the Human Relations Ordinance resulting from their
classifying the employment advertisements in columns headed
"Jobs-Male Interest," "Jobs-Female Interest" and "Male-Female
Help." 4  Pittsburgh Press attempted to disclaim any liability
for violation of the ordinance by publishing a notice which at-
tempted to justify the sex classification by claiming it was for the
convenience of the reader.55 The court struck the disclaimer
48. Authority for this position is found in the Statutory Construction
Act: "[A] later law shall not be construed to repeal an earlier law unless
the two laws be irreconcilable." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 591 (1969).
Another opinion of the Attorney General advised the Secretary of
Labor that Section 7 of the Child Labor Law PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 48
(1964) was void to the extent that it prohibited female minors above the
age of 12 from distributing newspapers when males of the same are were
permitted to do so. 1971 PA. OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE AT'VY GEN. 130.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(b) (2) (Supp. 1972).
50. Id. § 955(e).
51. Section 12.1 of the Human Relations Act permits the creation of
local human relations commissions by a political subdivision of the Com-
monwealth. These political subdivisions have the authority to grant
the local commissions powers and duties similar to the Pennsylvania Hu-
man Relations Commission. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962.1 (Supp. 1972).
52. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 75, Feb. 27, 1967, as amended, Ordi-
nance 395, July 8, 1969.
53. Id. § 9(e) and (j).
54. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 448, 454, 287 A.2d 161, 164-65, cert. granted, 93
S. Ct. 515 (1972).
55. Id. at 454, 287 A.2d at 164. The Pittsburgh Commission found that
employers were given the choice in which column they wanted their ad-
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down, observing that "the 'separate but equal' principle is no
longer a legitimate argument in civil rights cases" and a declara-
tion of intent can no longer be used as a "screen or defense for ac-
tual discrimination." 56
The court found that no specific injury need be alleged since
this was a charge of discrimination against a class and if the col-
umn headings were discriminatory, i.e. any difference in treat-
ment based on sex, they were a violation of the ordinance per se
and violative of such even before anyone suffered by it.
57 Pitts-
burgh Press' final argument concerned the infringement of its
constitutional right to "freedom of the press." The court disposed
of this argument by distinguishing the newspaper's editorial right
to print stories advocating or denouncing sex discrimination from
the newspaper's activities which aids an employer in sex dis-
crimination.5 8
By analogy, it appears that because of the similarities in the
powers and duties of the Pittsburgh Commission and the Pennsyl-
vania Commission, and the similarities of the relevant provisions of
the Human Relations Act with the Pittsburgh Ordinance, the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission would have the au-
thority to order any newspaper in the Commonwealth to abandon
their discriminatory classifications of employment advertisements
provided the employers are subject to the jurisdiction of the Act
and none of the postions which are advertised have received bona
fide occupational qualification exemption.5 9
III. PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION
A. Private Clubs as Places of Public Accommodation
Section 4(1) of the Human Relations Act defines a place of
vertisements placed. Thus it concluded that the Press' claim that the
column headings were for the benefit of the readers was unfounded and
contrary to its own finding that the employers were the ones benefited by
the classifications.
56. Id. at 461, 287 A.2d at 168.
The state of a human being without a job is a neutral fact, equally
applicable to both sexes. The finding of a job should also be a
neutral fact, equally accessible to both sexes.
Id. at 465-66, 287 A.2d at 170.
57. Id. at 460, 287 A.2d at 167.
58. Id. at 467, 287 A.2d at 171. The constitutional safeguard of free-
dom of the press is "that opinion is free, and that conduct alone is amen-
able to the law." See also Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236
U.S. 230, 243 (1915).
59. These were the limitations placed on the Final Order by the
Court. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 470, 287 A.2d at 172. See note 8 supra,
for a definition of employers covered by the act.
public accommodation "as any place which is open to, accepts, or so-
licits the patronage of the general public, including . . . any place
where food is sold for consumption on the premises . . . [and]
barrooms, . . . but shall not include any accommodations which
are in their nature distinctly private." 60  The Act makes it an un-
lawful discriminatory practice for the manager or superintendent
of any place of public accommodation to "refuse, withhold from,
or deny to any person because of his race, color [etc.] either di-
rectly or indirectly any of the accommodations, advantages, facili-
ties or privileges of such place .... "61 A fraternal association
is exempt where it discriminates on the basis of its membership in
the association.62  However, a fraternal association is not exempt
when it admits guests of members to its premises and discrimi-
nates against certain guests because of their race. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has narrowly construed this exception for
discrimination by private clubs by permitting them to discriminate
only on the basis of their membership policies in Human Rela-
tions Commission v. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge No. 107.63 The
court found that the Moose Lodge, in opening its dining room and
bar to non-members has become a place of public accommodation
and no longer a distinctly private club. Thus, it would appear
that any club, in order to retain its immunity from the operations
of the Act would have to admit members only to its premises,
thereby no longer compromising its privacy and exclusiveness,
and becoming an accommodation which by its very nature would
be distinctly private.
B. Primary and Secondary Schools as Places of Public
Accommodations
Section 4(1) defines high schools and primary and secondary
schools as places of public accommodation. The Act has been in-
terpreted to give the Commission jurisdiction over segregated 64
public schools in Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v.
Chester School District.6 5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court came
to this conclusion despite the school district's claim that the
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(1) (Supp. 1972).
61. Id. § 955(i)(1).
62. Id. § 955.
63. 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594, appeal dismissed, 93 S. Ct. 557 (1972).
In this case a black guest of a member was denied service solely because
of his race. The only defense the Lodge offered was that it was not a place
of public accommodation, hence exempt from the sanctions of the act.
64. The term discriminate is expressly defined to include segregate.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(g) (1964).
65. 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967). The Commission found that one
junior high school and five elementary schools in the district were all
Negro or substantially all Negro so it ordered the school district, inter
alia, to cease and desist from maintaining segregated schools within its
school system and to take immediate corrective measures to effectively de-
segregate the school within a reasonable period of time.
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words "refuse, withhold from, or deny" 66 require an intentional
and overt act on the part of the violator.6 ' The court reasoned
that this type of construction would frustrate the purposes of the
Human Relations Act, and, based on the section that calls for a
liberal construction of the Act in order to accomplish its pur-
poses, 68 construed the phrase to mean "where ... the responsible
party has the power to take corrective measures ... its failure
to act amounts to a continued withholding from most Negro child-
ren the admitted advantages of an integrated education." 9
Another contention dismissed by the court was that there was
an unconstitutional delegation of authority from the Legislature
to the Commission in the Act when it authorized the Commission to
order desegregation without defining the degree of racial imbal-
ance necessary to constitute segregation. The court felt that the
Legislature obviously planned a "case-by-case approach to the elim-
ination of racial imbalance in public schools.
'70
The Commission avoided a potential conflict of authority with
the School Board and its power to administer the district by not
ordering the Board to adopt any particular plan of desegrega-
tion, but rather ordering it to formulate and submit both an im-
mediate program to desegregate the most heavily segregated
areas and a long range plan for desegregation. 71 The plans were,
however, to be detailed, subject to certain Commission guidelines,
and due by a specific date.
72
As a result of a Commission directive which declared that the
Harrisburg City Schools were not racially integrated, a detailed
plan for quality desegregated education was submitted by the
Harrisburg School Board to the Commission for approval with im-
plementation to be made in 1970. A group of the school district's
taxpayers commenced an action to enjoin the School Board from
implementing this plan in Balsbaugh v. Rowland.73 The plan called
66. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
67. 427 Pa. at 165, 233 A.2d at 294.
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(a) (1964).
69. 427 Pa. at 165, 233 A.2d at 294-95. The court reasoned that
seemingly neutral decisions by the School Board frequently encourage
de facto segregation.
70. Id. at 179, 233 A.2d at 301. The court decided that the Commission
was also better equipped in terms of specialization and flexibility than the
courts to work with the districts and deal with racial imbalance.
71. Id. at 180-81, 233 A.2d at 302. The Commission convinced the
court that the school district has "primary responsibility for the choice
and implementation of an effective desegregation program."
72. Id.
73. 447 Pa. 423, 290 A.2d 85 (1972). The Dauphin County Court of
for the distribution of black and white pupils "with a maximum
variance of ten per cent from the total percentage of such child-
ren in the district" throughout the schools and classes within the
schools.
7 4
The taxpayers' complaint was based upon two premises. First,
the Board, in adopting the plan, did not exercise its proper discre-
tion because it was not acting under its own judgment, but under
the duress of the compulsion of the Human Relations Commis-
sion. 75 This contention was quickly dismissed by the court which
recited the Commission's authority to require school boards to take
corrective measures to overcome de facto segregation." The
court also found that the School Board was acting within the scope
of its statutory authority in its attempt to improve the quality of
education in the District by adopting the desegregation plan.
7 7
The court felt that it made no difference whether the Board's action
was a result of its own initiative or whether it was prompted by
the Commission's orders.
The second premise supporting the taxpayers complaint was
that the plan was an unconstitutional denial of the fourteenth
amendment equal protection guarantees. This charge implied
that one has an inherent right to a neighborhood school and that
taxpayers of the District could enforce this right by enjoining the
expenditure of public tax monies to finance a corrective bussing
program. Since the segregation was of a de facto nature, the tax-
payers argued, the racial imbalance was not a result of state ac-
tion, and corrective measures disturbing the "neighborhood school"
arrangements constitute state action which denied equal protec-
tion of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.'
The court emphatically disagreed with this argument and found
that it would be anomalous if assignment and bussing of pupils
were permitted to defeat de jure racial segregation, but were con-
sidered as unreasonable and discriminatory in dealing with de
facto segregation.79 Since the benefits and the burdens of deseg-
regation were shared equally by all racial groups, the court con-
Common Pleas sustained the Board's demurrer to the action and the tax-
payers filed an appeal.
74. Id. at 429-30, 290 A.2d at 89. It must be noted that the plan not
only seeks to achieve racial balance, but to also develop a comprehensive
restructuring of the children within the district. Impoverished students
and students on the intellectual extremes are to be distributed evenly
throughout the system. The Board was to achieve these goals by bussing
29 per cent of the students with each racial group being equally subject to
transportation.
75. Id. at 432, 290 A.2d at 90.
76. The court relied on Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.
Chester School Dist., discussed in notes 65-72 and accompanying text
supra.
77. 447 Pa. at 433, 290 A.2d at 91.
78. Id. at 436, 290 A.2d at 92.
79. Id. at 438, 290 A.2d at 93.
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cluded the plan could not be declared unconstitutional."0
It would appear from the Chester and Balsbaugh decisions
that the Commission's power to order desegregation has been com-
pletely and unequivocally established, but some school districts
throughout the state are still searching for a nonexistent loop-
hole in the Human Relations Act through which they can con-
tinue to maintain racially imbalanced schools. School District of
Philadelphia v. Human Relations Commission"' represents an ap-
peal of this nature. This action was a consolidation of five 2 school
districts' appeals from orders of the Commission to submit a plan
to achieve racial balance in its public schools. The appellant school
districts attacked the Commission's definition of racial imbalance
as being arbitrary and capricious. This definition states that
any school with a Negro enrollment of more or less than thirty
per cent of the total percentage of Negro students in the school
district is racially imbalanced.8 3 This would make a school com-
posed of fifty-five per cent blacks racially imbalanced in a school
district with an overall nine per cent Negro population. The com-
monwealth court found that the Commission's definition of racial
imbalance was not arbitrary or capricious in light of the Bals-
baugh opinion which upheld a ten per cent variance in that deseg-
regation plan. Relying heavily on Chester, the court concluded
that the Commission is the body designated by the Legislature for
determining the existence of substantial racial imbalance. Also,
"when courts are forced to devise and supervise programs whose
goal is the elimination of racial imbalance they are acting in an
area alien to their expertise.
'8 4
Judge Mencer's dissenting opinion conceded that upon a find-
ing of de facto segregation, the Commission can take jurisdiction,
but he attempted to distinguish Balsbaugh and Chester by noting
that the finding of the existence of de facto segregation was un-
der attack by the school districts here whereas in the preceding
cases its existence was unchallenged.' However, the Commission
has declared that a thirty per cent variance from the school popu-
lation is prima facie segregation and for a court to modify this find-
ing by alleging the necessity of a fifty per cent variance, for ex-
80. Id.
81. 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 281, 294 A.2d 410 (1972).
82. Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Uniontown, New Castle, and New Kens-
ington-Arnold.
83. 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 295, 294 A.2d at 416-17.
84. 427 Pa. at 179, 233 A.2d at 301.
85. See note 121 and accompanying text infra on the court's author-
ity to reverse the Commission.
ample, would be to have the court substitute its own discretion
for that of the Commission's. Therefore, if a school does in fact
have a variance of greater than thirty per cent from the per cent
of the total school district population, this should be sufficient to
support a finding of de facto segregation.8 6
A conclusion reached by these three cases easily reveals that
the Commission has the full support of the Commonwealth's judi-
ciary system in ordering school districts to submit desegregation
plans where the record reveals by substantial evidence the existence
of racial imbalance throughout schools in the district. It should
also be noted that any reasonable plan including bussing 7 will
be upheld by the courts.
rV. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REMEDIES AVAILABLE
TO THE COMMISSION
A. Commission Procedure and Enforcement
The filing of a complaint is a necessary condition to invoke the
Commission's jurisdiction over a controversy involving an unlawful
discriminatory practice.88 The Act gives a number of parties the
right to file a complaint. They include any allegedly aggrieved in-
dividual, the Commission itself, the Commonwealth's Attorney Gen-
eral, or any employer or organization "whose employees . . . hin-
der or threaten to hinder compliance with the [Act]."s9 Once the
86. The total school district population would logically appear to be
the basis for determining the extent of racial imbalance in a school. The
Commission can only equalize racial balance within school districts since
it does not yet have the authority to require plans ordering pupil transfers
over school district lines. Hence any school having a seventy per cent
black enrollment in a district which is sixty per cent black is "racially
balanced" even though it does not reflect the proportion of blacks in the
state or nation as a whole.
87. "Forced bussing" in Pennsylvania is less widespread than critics
of the Commission would like to have the public believe.
In the 20 school districts in which desegregation is being car-
ried out in Pennsylvania only 8,127 additional pupils are being
bused for desegregation purposes.
In Pennsylvania based on last year's figures, 1,291,032 pupils
(54.5%) are being bused daily to public schools, and an additional
73,016 pupils are being transported on public school buses to non-
public schools every day. The 8,127 pupils being bused to help
desegregate schools are less than 2/3 of 1 per cent of this total.
In these 20 school districts the 8,127 pupils represent only 15
per cent of the total of 54,533 public school pupils being bused
for all purposes in these districts.
11 HUMAN RELATIONS REPORT, Winter, 1972, at 1.
88. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (1964) (Supp. 1972) for an enu-
meration of the unlawful discriminatory practices over which the Com-
mission has jurisdiction.
89. Id. § 959. The Act provides that no actions shall be taken by the
Commission against the employer when he files a complaint "asking for
assistance by conciliation or other remedial action" during the period of
conciliation. It would be interesting to speculate on the outcome of Wilk-
insburg School Dist. v. Human Relations Comm'n (see notes 22 to 24 and
accompanying text supra) if the School District had filed a complaint im-
mediately after the hostility developed between Mrs. Nichols and the white
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complaint is filed, 90 a Commission field representative will conduct
a preliminary investigation and determine whether or not prob-
able cause for the complaint exists. If probable cause does exist,
the Commission is obligated to "endeavor to eliminate the unlawful
discriminatory practice complained of by conference, conciliation
and persuasion." 91 If conference, conciliation and persuasion fail
to eliminate the alleged discriminatory practice, the Commission
may serve a copy of the complaint and a notice to answer the
charges at a hearing before the Commission.92 If probable cause
is found not to exist, or if satisfactory adjustments are made as a
result of a conciliation agreement, the complaint may be dis-
missed,93 or a type of a consent order may be entered against the
respondent.
4
teacher and before the District transferred both of them to new positions.
It is quite possible the ensuing litigation could have been avoided had the
District drawn upon the Commission's services and expertise. The Com-
mission may or may not have accepted the District's proposal to reassign
the teachers to new positions, but any alternative recommendations the
Commission might offer during the conciliatory period could be no more
offensive to the District than the costs of its present course in terms of
time and money expended in the litigation and any public relations ef-
forts needed to reduce any resulting racial animosities.
90. Commission literature states that it will aid the complainant in
drafting the wording and legal format of the complaint subject to the
complainant's approval and for his notarized signature. Pa. Human Rela-
tions Comm'n, GuwzE FOR COMPLAINANTS. The complaint must be filed
within 90 days of the occurrence of the unlawful discriminatory practice.
16 PA. CODE § 41.11 (1972).
91. Id. § 959. The Pittsburgh School District argued in Philadelphia
School Dist. v. Human Relations Comm'n (see note 81 supra) that the
"Commission may not file an order unless it has conducted investigations,
conferences, conciliation, and persuasion prior to conducting a hearing on a
complaint filed against a school district." 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 284,
294 A.2d at 411. The court conceded that this contention would have an
increased influence had any substantial facts been in dispute or had it
appeared conciliation would have been effective, but found that the Dis-
trict had not altered its position after the first conciliatory meeting and
that the record did not disclose the Commission's "failure to attempt to
resolve the matters in an amicable rather than in an adversary manner."
Id. at 288, 294 A.2d at 413.
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (1964), 16 PA. COD § 41.42 (1972).
1 PA. CODE §§ 35.121-.128 also governs the Commission's hearing proced-
ures. The complainant and respondent have a right to have the hearing
located in the county where the alleged offense was committed. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (1964). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 957(g) for the
Commission's adjudicative procedural powers.
93. If the complaint is dismissed, the complainant has the right to
petition for reconsideration of the dismissal within ten days of the receipt
of the notice of dismissal. The petition shall include new evidence not
previously considered by the Commission. 16 PA. CODE § 41.23 (1972). If
the petition is granted, the complaint is reinvestigated through a pre-
liminary hearing. Id. § 41.24.
94. If the complainant is dissatisfied with the terms of the adjust-
If the Commission finds that a respondent has engaged in an
unlawful discriminatory practice, it shall issue an order to cease
and desist from the practice.9 5 The Act also authorizes the Com-
mission to "take such affirmative action. . . as, in the judgment of
the Commission, will effectuate the purposes of this act ....
These orders may be enforced by the complainant, the Commission,
or the Attorney General by petitioning the Commonwealth Court
or the court of common pleas in the county within which the
hearing was held.9 7 A failure to obey the order of the court can
be punished as contempt of that court.9 8 Violation of a Commission
order is a misdemeanor punishable by a $100 to $500 fine and/or up
to thirty days in prison.99
It is not difficult for the Commission to test a respondent for
compliance and secure a conviction if the order is violated. The
primary reason for this is that the Commission has complete con-
trol of the fact situations concerning the violation of the ordei
without the fear of any entrapment defense. The Commission,
having complete knowledge of its order, can present the respond-
ent with an opportunity to violate it, if the respondent is intent
on noncompliance.
In Bey v. Woodring,100 a beautician refused to serve the com-
plainant because of her race. The Commission found her in vio-
lation of Section 5(i) of the Act 1° ' and ordered her to "cease and
desist from . . . refusing, withholding from or denying to . . . Ne-
groes . . . the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges
of the beauty shop. .... ,"12 Approximately ten weeks after the
final order was entered, the Commission sent a white staff mem-
ber to the respondent's beauty shop where she was offered her
choice of appointments.' 0 3 She was followed a few minutes la-
ter by a black staff member who was told that the respondent
was not accepting new customers and that she was booked up for
ment, he also has a right to petition for reconsideration. Id. § 41.26. Com-
mission regulations require it to investigate the respondent one year after
the adjustment order has been entered to ascertain the respondent's con-
tinued compliance. Id. § 41.28.
95. Id. § 959 (Supp. 1972).
96. Id. This affirmative action includes but is not limited to (1)
"hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees with or without back
pay, (2) admission or restoration to membership in any respondent labor
organization, or (3) selling or leasing specified commercial housing ...
upon such equal terms and conditions to any person discriminated against
or [to] all persons. Id.
97. Id. § 960.
98. Id. The court has the power to modify the decree and enforce it
as modified, to simply enforce the decree, or to set it aside.
99. Id. § 961.
100. No. P. 676 (Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, Feb. 22,
1971).
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(i) (Supp. 1972).
102. No. P-676 at 10.
103. Id. (Addendum to the decision).
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a long time in the future..04 The Commission filed a criminal com-
plaint with a local justice of the peace and established a prima
facie case; the respondent later pleaded guilty in Allegheny
County Criminal Court and was fined $100 and costs.
10 5
Very little deviation from the established procedures has been
permitted by the courts. In Philadelphia v. Human Relations
Commission,'°6 a Commission order was set aside because of the
complainant's failure to present a proper complaint.10 7 Because the
complaint on its face failed to state an unlawful discriminatory
practice, the court felt that the Commission attempted to shift the
burden of proof by transforming the complaint proceeding into an
exemption proceeding.1 08 The court noted that this violated the
Commission's own provisions for securing occupation exemp-
tions.10 9 The rule of the Philadelphia case appears to caution the
Commission against materially altering the charge of the com-
planaint from one matter to some other matter "at the hearing or
in the Commission's adjudication." 110 To do so the Commission
would risk having their order set aside." 1
104. Id. The purpose of sending the white staff member into the
shop first was to seal off any possible defenses the respondent might have
for claiming a denial of service for a legitimate reason. If the white
woman had been denied service for the same reasons given to the black
woman, no violation of the order could have occurred because the denial
of service would have been based on factors other than race. Sending
the black woman into the shop within a few minutes after the white
woman precluded a defense that the circumstances materially changed
between the visits. It would be extremely improbable for the respondent
to honestly claim she received enough appointments within the few min-
utes between visits to warrant turning the black woman away.
105. Id.
106. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 506, 287 A.2d 703 (1972).
107. The complainant was refused an application for the position of
Fairmount Park Guard on the Philadelphia Police Force because the clerk
told her "women were not allowed to apply." The evidence revealed that
those positions were filled from the ranks of Philadelphia's regular Police
Force and only upon acceptance to the regular force could any applicant's
assignment be made to the Fairmount Park Guard. Thus, because no
one can file an application directly with the Fairmount Park Guard, the
complainant failed to show "different treatment based on sex."
108. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 513, 287 A.2d at 707-08. It appears
that the Commission took testimony on the city's attempt to justify a bona
fide occupational qualification under the Act's exemption provisions.
109. See note 36 supra. The employer must initiate those proceedings.
110. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 512, 287 A.2d at 707. Although the
gist of the action remained substantively similar, the court still con-
demned any material procedural alterations.
111. In many cases, if the discriminatory practice was no longer
continued, the 90 day limitation on filing the complaint will have expired
leaving the complainant without a remedy.
B. Scope of Appellate Review of the Commission
Section 10 of the Human Relations Act 11 2 provides for judi-
cial review of the Commission's orders under the provisions of the
Administrative Agency Law. 13 In reviewing these orders, the
grounds most frequently used for setting them aside involve a
conclusion that the Commission's findings of fact are not supported
by substantial evidence. 114  Romain v. Middletown Area School
District'1 5 demonstrates the extent to which the courts will go in
finding a lack of substantial evidence necessary to support the
Commission's findings. Mrs. Romain, one of thirty-seven appli-
cants for sixteen positions, was not hired even though the District's
hiring official found her better qualified than four of those ap-
plicants who were hired. The Commission found that Mrs. Ro-
main was the best qualified and concluded that the District com-
mitted an unlawful discriminatory practice by refusing to hire
the individual "best able and most competent to perform the serv-
ices required" ' 6 because of her race. 11 7 The court, however, rea-
soned that just because the Commission's expert found Mrs. Romain
better qualified does not mean that the District should necessarily
reach that conclusion." 5s Furthermore, there had been testimony
showing that the applications were passed upon without any
knowledge as to race by some of the District's officials. The Com-
mission also failed to offer evidence showing that the hiring offi-
cial had the exclusive authority to hire any applicants. Hence, its
findings that Mrs. Romain was best qualified were not based on
any substantial evidence, and its conclusions that the District was
racially motivated 1 9 against hiring her was based on no evidence
in the record.
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 960 (Supp. 1972).
113. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-1710.51 (1962). A particularly
pertinent part provides guidelines for affirming the Commission's or-
ders:
After the hearing, the court shall affirm the adjudication unless it
shall find that the same (1) is in violation of the constitutional
rights of the appellant, or (2) is not in accordance with law, or
[ (3) the procedural guarantees of this Act (pertaining to rights to
cross examination, etc.)] have been violated in the proceeding be-
fore the agency, or (3) that any finding of fact made by the agency
and necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence....
Id. § 1710.44.
114. See, e.g., Marhoefer v. Human Relations Comm'n, 4 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 242, 285 A.2d 547 (1971), and Gabriele v. Boeing Co., Vertol
Div., 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 96, 272 A.2d 527 (1971).
115. 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 419, 275 A.2d 400 (1971).
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a) (1964).
117. 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 421, 275 A.2d at 401.
118. Id.
119. The act of discrimination in hiring because of race must
necessarily entail either the refusal because of race to hire the per-
son found to be the best qualified, or the refusal because of race to
find a person best qualified. Either situation involves the moti-
vation and determination by the hiring official or body as to the
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In dissent, Judge Manderino perceptively noted that in cases
before the Human Relations Commission, "the record will seldom
contain direct evidence of racial motivation. '" 120 If the finder of
fact rejects offered explanations for not hiring one better quali-
fied than those who were hired, it can reach a rational conclusion
of racial motivation, provided it is exercising its sound discre-
tion.
121
Both the majority and dissenting opinions offer valid analy-
sis of the problems of judicial review of the Commission. The dis-
sent apparently feels that racial motivation is a finding of fact
inferred from the record since it is obvious no one named as a re-
spondent before the Commission would admit racial motivation
was behind his actions. The majority appears to require that
demonstrations of racial motivation must appear substantially in
the record before a finding of its existence can be made. The dis-
senting opinion cited a definition of substantial evidence as "evi-
dence sufficient to convince a reasonable mind to a fair degree of
certainty." '12 2 Romain obviously involves a fact situation in which
reasonable minds differ.
V. CONCLUSION
The past two or three years have revealed the Human Rela-
tions Commission's flexibility in dealing with new problems involv-
ing sex discrimination and school desegregation as they arise. The
Commission has been responsive to those seeking sexual equality by
ordering mandatory maternity policies be struck down and by
issuing guidelines which define permissible and illegal employ-
ment practices, thus, helping inform women of their rights and aid-
ing employers in complying with the provisions of the law.123 The
Commission has provided the necessary affirmative leadership
and authority in ordering schools to submit desegregation plans
thus filling the vacuum created by the school boards, the legisla-
applicant's qualifications.
Id.
120. Id. at 425, 275 A.2d at 403.
121. Id.
122. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Kaufmann Dept. Stores,
Inc., 345 Pa. 398, 29 A.2d 90 (1942).
123. It should be noted to the practitioner that the Commission prob-
ably provides the least complex forum for prosecuting suits to enjoin
discriminatory conduct. The Commission makes its expertise in this area
of the law available at all stages of the litigation. The variety of reme-
dies created in the Human Relations Act and exclusively available
through the Commission also make it a more flexible forum for handling
complaints of discrimination than, say, the federal procedures.
ture, the taxpayers, and the courts who all were apparently satis-
fied with preserving the status quo. It has sought to expand the
application of the Act by advancing new and equitable interpre-
tations of it and gaining the courts' approval in some instances.
There are a few improvements which could be made in the
Act to increase its effectiveness in dealing with offenders. First,
the fines could be raised to increase their deterrent effect on vi-
olators and bring them in line with fines for other misdemeanors.
Secondly, compliance with the Human Relations Act should be
made a necessary precondition for any licensee of the Common-
wealth to retain his license.
The Human Relations Commission should be given the author-
ity to order the license revoked or suspended should they find a vi-
olation of the Act. These changes coupled with continued vigo-
rous administration of the Act should continue to build the pub-
lic's confidence in this particular type of remedy for aggrieved vic-
tims of discrimination.
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